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IMPACT OF SUBORDINATE THREATS ON LEADERS' PAY ALLOCATION 
DECISIONS 
Mark Fulford, Univers ity of Central Missouri 
In many different conte.:cts within organizations today, attempts are made by direct reports to influence the 
decisions of their leaders. In no context does the resulting decision hit closer to home for a direct report 
than those related to the allocation of pay raises. Under what conditions are attempts by direct reports to 
influence their leaders' pay allocation decisions most effective? Wit at effect does a threat by the 
subordinate have on the leader's decision ? Does the severity of the threat used matter? In an attempt to 
answer these questions, a study was conducted of leaders' pay allocation decisions under the conditions of 
varying levels of dependence and varying levels of severity of threat used by a focal direct report. Results 
indicated support for the interactive effects between dependence and dependency threats on leaders' pay 
allocation decisions (i.e. , leaders allocated significantly higher increases to those direct reports upon 
whom they were highly dependent only when the direct report threatened the dependence relationship). 
Support was also found for the effects of threat severity (i.e., when the leader was highly dependent on the 
subordinate, more severe threats led to higher allocations). The results allow a more complete 
understanding of managerial pay allocation decisions and provide the groundwork for additional 
research. 
INTRODUCTION 
Pay has been shown to have significant effects on the 
attitudes and behaviors of employees (Lawler, 198 le). In 
attempting to increase employee moti vation , many 
organizations have implemented merit pay programs. 
However, such programs have come under severe 
scrutiny for appearing to recogn ize and reward factors 
other than perfom1ance (thus vio lating the " merit" 
principle) . 
Many of the investigations into thi s area have focu sed 
on the heuristics (or decision-making stTategies) used by 
allocators (Deshpande & Schoderbek, 1993; Hi ggins, 
Judge, & Ferris, 2003); the assumption is that allocators 
(some more than others) are subconsciously biased by 
factors other than performance. However, it is also 
possible, in some cases, that all ocators are well aware 
that their pay allocation decisions are inconsistent wi th 
what is merited based solely on performance. [t is 
plausible that some a llocators are reacting to ' 'upward 
influence attempts" (Kipni s, Schmidt, & Wilkinson , 
1980; Yuki & Falbe, 1990) by their direc t reports who 
hope to receive pay allocations in excess of that which is 
merited by their perfonmnce alone (Thacker, 1998). If 
this is the case, under what cond iti ons mi ght these 
attempts be most successful? 
Dependence 
According to French & Raven ( 1959) , pay is a source 
of reward power which an allocator can use to influence 
the beha vior of direct reports. However, reciprocal 
influence is poss ible as wel l. Bartol & Martin (1988) 
argue that managers use pay not only as a reward for 
perfom1ance, but also as a way to manage their 
dependencies on direct reports. As they point out, 
"Indi viduals possess power because others are dependent 
upon them for access to resources that cannot be obtained 
eas ily elsewhere", (p. 364) . 
One source of dependence on direct reports is the 
possess ion of ski ll s which are not easi ly replaced from 
the labor pool (Barto l & Martin, 1988; Pfeffer, 198 1 ). 
Freedman & Montanari ( 1980) state, "employees who 
possess ski ll s that are in high demand are in powerful 
positi ons relative to the organ ization . Th is power can be 
used to sh ift the emphasis of managerial goa Is for the 
reward program from performance to attraction and 
retenti on", (p. 387). Kante r ( 1977) proposes several 
sources that may create a situation of dependency of the 
leader on the subordinate: perfom1ance monitorship 
(when performance becomes more difficult to monitor) ; 
perfom1ance visibili ty (when more individual s are aware 
of the outcomes of ones perfonnance); specialized skill 
(when the d irec t report possesses skills the leader does 
not) ; task centra li ty (when the tasks performed by the 
di rect report are part of the leader' s cuiTent agenda) ; and 
organi zat ional connec ti ons (when the direct report i-
po litically connected wit hin the organi zation). 
309 
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Oepend ence Thr·eat 
G iven that leaders are dependent on every subordina te 
to some extent, w hat other factors a ffec t manageri a l pay 
a lloca tion dec is io ns? According to Barto l & M artin 
( 1988), leaders must ca re full y consider the types o f 
re la tionships w hi ch ex is t be tween themse lves and each o f 
the ir d irect repo rts. T hey propo e that leaders w ill not 
o nl y cons ider the degree of dependence on a particular 
d irect report, but a lso the potenti a l threa t to the 
dependency re lati onship. In other words, a ll ocators will 
onl y " pay" fo r dependence w hen tha t dependence 
re la ti onship is threatened . Dependency threats are made 
in one of several ways: po tenti al di rect report turnover, 
including move ment w ithin the o rgani zati on; potentia l 
dec lines in critica l d irect report behaviors in dependence 
a rea (e .g ., reduced productivity, increased absentee ism, 
less wi llingness to share specia li zed knowledge/skill s, 
etc .) ; and potentia l subver ive ac ti ons aga in t the 
supervi sor. 
Ba rtol & Martin ( 1989) proposed several cond it ions 
that sho ul d result in a larger than no rmal pay increase 
fro m the a ll oca tor: I) the req uest i trong eno ugh to 
constitute a dependency threa t, 2) the ituation provide 
so me ho pe o f reso lving the prob lem with be tter pay , and 
3) the demand i no t so stro ng that it is perce ived as a 
d irec t cha ll enge to the po wer o f the a lloca to r. Under low 
de pendence cond iti o ns, it is tho ug ht tha t threa ts o f any 
kind w ill not be c flc cti vc ( i.e ., the leader does not re ly 
heavily upo n the subo rd ina te; there fore, threa ts o f any 
kind do not have to be tolera ted). Under high dependence 
cond iti ons, it i thought that threa ts are more e ffecti ve as 
their severi ty increases-up to a po int. Reme mber that pay 
a lloca tion is a way for the leader to ma inta in conb·o l over 
de pendenc ies. G iven a direct report, upon who m the 
leader is hi g hl y de pendent, ma kin g exec s ive demands or 
threa ts, the leader 's contro l is threa te ned . T here fore, the 
leader may in it ia ll y award a high inc rease in order to 
restore contro l, but, perhaps due to psyc hologica l 
reactance (B re hm, 1966), the leader 's percept ion o f the 
direct report may become mo re nega tive and , in the lo ng 
run , may resul t in a ttempt by the leader to gel ri d o f the 
tro uble ma ker (T hacker & Wayne, 1995). O ne way to do 
th 1s may be to in tenti o na ll y award low increases to 
prompt the direcl repo rt to ·ever the re la ti onship. 
ll ypot hcsis I: Leaders' pay a ll oca tion 
dec is io ns arc a ffcc ted by dependence on the 
su bordin ::~te o nly w hen the subord ina te 
threa tens the dependency re lati onship . 
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Hypothesis 2: When leaders are highly 
dependent on subordinates, the ir pay allocation 
dec is io ns are direc tl y re lated to the severity of 
subordinates' threa ts to the dependence 
re latio nship. 
Very little e mpirica l work has been conducted in these 
a reas. A a matter o f fac t, there are onl y two studies 
whi ch have investi gated the dependence-dependency 
threa t in terac tion (Barto l & M artin , 1990; 1989). Up to 
thi s po int, there have been no in vesti ga tions of the e ffects 
o f vary ing leve ls of dependency threat severity on pay 
a llocation decis ion In each of the two studi es noted 
above, dependency threa t d id no t vary; it was e ither 
present or absent. In an attempt to determine the e ffects 
o f thr eat severi ty on the pay a ll ocations of leaders who 
a re dependent on the foca l direct report, a study of 
manageri a l pay a lloca tion dec is ions was undertaken. By 
looking at two types o f inn uence tacti c which differ in 
severity (a n approac h not investigated previously) , a long 
with dependence issues, th is research will extend the 
pre vi o us work in thi s area and w ill lay the groundwork 
toward a mo rC' ;o mplctc understand ing of managerial pay 
a lloca tion deci s ions. 
Methodology 
Beca use pay is such a sens iti ve issue within 
orga ni za tion s, ga ining access to the pay a ll ocation 
deci s ions of leaders is diffi cult. However, it is possible to 
rec reate s itua tions for those w ith pay a ll oca ti on 
cx pen cncc w here their dec is io ns are more eas il y 
ca ptured . O ne hundred fourteen parti c ipants m a 
leader h ip dcve lopme nl pro~:,•Tam a t a metTopo li tan area 
un ive rs ity loca ted in the Mid weste rn Uni ted States served 
as the s tud y samp le. Because most o f the e indi viduals 
were e mp loyed full -ti me w ithin organiza ti ons, it was 
assumed tha t a su ffi c ient nu mber of them wo uld have 
ex peri ence ma king pay a ll ocati on dec ision . 
An in-baske t exerc ise wa used in w hi ch the pay 
a lloca tion i sue was e mbedded . Subjects were in tructed 
to assume the ro le o f a new ly appo inted Vice-Pres ident in 
c harge o f the c red it ana lys is unit o f a reg iona l 
commerc ia l bank. Accord ing to the in fo rmati on provided, 
the prev io us un it head had le ft on short noti ce to take a 
hi gher leve l pos ition at ano ther bank. Each subj ec t was 
to ld tha t they had been trans fC rred fro m an a rea bank tha t 
had ju t been acq uired by the reg io na l bank. T he previous 
uni t head prov ided so me bri ef background informati on 
rega rd ing the job: the work load had been unusua ll y 
heavy la te ly and ge ll in g and keeping qua lifi ed peopl e had 
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been a continuing difficulty. Information was provided 
regarding the subject's new staff of five credit analysts, 
including name, tenure with the regional bank, previous 
place of employment, and special area of experti se. All of 
the analysts were given gender neutral first names to 
avoid confounding the study manipulations with gender 
effects. The focal analyst was described as hav ing been 
with the regional bank for three years and specialized in 
"high growth companies, particul arl y involving loans to 
be secured by accounts receivable and/or inventory (often 
referred to as 'asset based lending')." None of the other 
analysts were described as having this special area of 
expertise. 
The situation was depicted as a Sunday afternoon ; no 
one else was in the office, the fil es were locked, and the 
subject had arrived at the office for the first time. In 
addition, the subject would be leaving that evening for an 
important bank training program that wou ld last a week 
and would not leave time to do any office work. Hence, 
any pressing matters had to be handled prior to leaving. A 
memo from the Vice President of Human Resources 
indicated that recommended pay rai ses had to be turned 
in on an attached fom1 by the deadline, three days away. 
The memo further stated that if the recommendations 
were not received by the due date, fifty percent of the unit 
raise money would automatica ll y revert back to the 
central merit pool. Each subj ect had to make the meri t 
increase recommendations, because the previous unit 
head sent a memo to the subj ect stating that he felt the 
new department head should determine the pay raises . 
The previous unit head included hi s most recent 
appraisals of the staffs ind ividua l performance. The 
rating scale contai ned five levels. rangmg from 
exceptional to unsati s factory. Only the top three levels 
(exceptional , commendable, and good) were assigned to 
the five analysts. The foca l ana lyst was given a 
commendable rating. 
The memo from the vice president of HR also 
informed subj ects that $ 17,500 was avai lab le for 
di stribution among the five anal ysts. The attached merit 
rai se recommendation form contai ned the names of the 
analysts and their current sa laries, which ranged from 
$28,000 to $40,000, along with a set of boxes in which to 
place the recommendation. The current sa lary for the 
focal anal yst was $36,000, making him/her the third 
hi ghest pa id anal yst. 
Two levels of dependence were created ; low and hi gh. 
The dependence va ri ab le was manipul ated by a copy of a 
memo from the Executive Vice Pres ident of Loans to the 
indi vidua l to whom the subjects directly reported 
indicating a shi ft in strategic directions by the bank 's 
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strategic planning committee. [n the low dependence 
condition, the memo stated that there would be less 
emphasis on commercial lending to hi gh growth 
companies. This shi ft in strategic direction lowered the 
dependence on the focal analyst relative to the other 
analysts who had experti se in more traditi ona l lending 
areas . In the high dependence cond ition , the memo stated 
that the strategic planning committee had decided to shift 
toward greater emphasis on commercial lending to hi gh 
growth companies. This shift had the effect of rai sing 
dependence on the foca l ana lyst since none of the other 
ana lysts had this experti se. 
Three levels of dependency threat were created; low, 
medi um, and hi gh. It should be poin ted out, however, that 
the high condition was not meant to be so severe as to 
cause the " reactance" phenomenon (Brehm, 1966) as 
proposed by Bartol & Martin (1988). It was only meant 
to be more severe than the medium condition in order to 
test the effects of threat severi ty. Thi s variable was also 
manipulated via memo contained in the exercise. In the 
hi gh threat severity condition, the focal analyst 
acknowledged that merit rai se recommendations were 
due shortl y and that a substantial increase was expected . 
The focal ana lyst also threatened the subj ect by indicating 
that if a substantial increase were not rece ived, an offer of 
employment received from a competing firm would be 
accepted . In the moderate threat severity condition , the 
focal analyst acknowledged that meri t ra1se 
recommendati ons were due shortl y and that, if a sizeab le 
increase were not received, he/she may have to begin 
exploring other alternatives . In the low threat severi ty 
condition , the foca l ana lyst infom1ed the subj ect that 
he/she was appl ying to the bank for a mortgage loan, 
because he/she was building a new house. 
Suhj ects were asked, as part of the in-basket exercise, 
to al locate merit pay to all five analysts whose 
perfom1ance appraisa l ratings were provided. However , 
the on ly information of interest was that pertaining to the 
a llocations made for the foca l ana lyst. Therefore, the 
dependent variab le represented the dollar amount of the 
recommended increase for the focal analyst. 
A 2x3 between-subj ects factorial des ign was used in this 
study (all manipul ations were chec ked in a pi lo t study 
and found to be operating as expected). Ba ed upon the 
results from a Power Anal ys is proced ure outlined by 
Cohen ( 1977), the target wa s at leas t 15 subjects per ce ll. 
Thus, a minimum o f 90 subj ects wa s des ired . As 
indica ted earli er, I 14 subj ects went through the in-basket 
exerc ise. However, only I 04 of those subj ec ts provided 
complete in fo rmation on a ll of the variabl es of interest. 
The number o f subjects in the fina l study still exceeds the 
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number required by the power analysis. Of the I 04 
subj ects that provided complete infonnation, 15 were in 
the low-low trea tment condition , 17 were in the low-
medium treatment condition , 18 were in the low-high 
trea tment condition , 18 were in the hi gh-low treatment 
condition , 19 were 111 the high-medium treatment 
condition, and 17 were in the high-hi gh treatment 
condition. 
An analys is of variance (ANOV A) was used to test 
the ma in effects of dependence and dependency threat 
severity, as well as the interacti on effect between them, 
on subjects ' pay a llocation dec is ions. ln order to fully test 
for the effects of threat severity, one-way ANOV As were 
used to test the mean di ffe rences across study conditions. 
As a result, subj ect demographics were as follows: 
Journal of Business and Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching 
59% male, 41 % female ; 48% of the men had experience 
supervi sing the work of others , while 33% of the women 
had such experience; 43% of the men had made merit 
a llocations previously, while 33% of the women had 
made merit a llocations previously, meaning 39% of all 
subjects had this experience prior to the study; the 
average number of years of work experience for the 
entire subj ec t population was 7.2 years, with a range from 
1-23 yea rs; there were no significant differences in years 
of work experience between the men and the women. 
Tab le I illustrates the mean salary mcrease 
recommendations for the focal analyst (the direct report 
upon whom subj ects were dependent and by whom they 
were threatened) according to each of the study 
conditions. 
Table 1: Mean Pay Increase Recommendations (in Dollars) 
for the F ocal Analyst b y Each Study C ondition 




T.n order to statisti ca ll y de tennine whether managerial 
pay a llocation dec is ions a re affected by the presence of 
dependency relationships onl y when the dependency 
$36 15.43 $3643 .78 
$3749.4 1 $3699.70 
$3665.28 $4080.82 
re lation shi p~ are threatened (i.e. , test hypothesis 1), an 
ANOV 1 was performed to examine the interaction 
between dependence and dependency threat. 
Tab le 2: AN OV A Results for the 2x3 Dependence/Dependency Threat Factorial 
So urce of variation 
1\ l ain Effects 
Dependence (D) 
Dependency Threat Severity (TS) 




As seen in table 2, the interaction tem1 between 
dependence and dependency threat severi ty was 
statistica ll y s ignificant. T hi s finding supports hypot hesis 
1. In o rder to fu ll y detenn inc if, when leaders are highl y 
dependent on direct reporis. the ir pay a ll ocation deci s ions 
arc directly re lated to the everity of d irect reports' 
threa ts to the dependence re la ti onship (i.e., test 
OF MS F Pro b. 
I 447806.97 2.67 .105 
2 517 180.04 3.09 .050 
2 545-1 66.16 3.25 .043 
5 498-120.38 2.973 .015 
98 167625.68 
103 183683 .68 
hypothes is 2) , the interacti on tenn from the previous 
ANOV A had to be broken down into simple effects; the 
e ffects of dependency threat severity had to be 
detennined for each leve l of dependence . Two separate 
one-way ANOV As, one for high dependence and one for 
low dependence conditi ons, were perfonned. Table 3 
con ta ins the resu lts of thi s ana lys is . 
Table 3: Results of One-Way ANOV As of Dependency Threat Severity on 
Me rit Pay Allocation Decisions fo r Each C ondition of D ependence 
So urce of \ 'ar iation OF 1\lS F l'robabili_ly 
Hinh D<·p<•nd<·ncc 
IJet" ecn Group> 2 990557 5 1 .j 86 .012 
Wuhm Group> 52 20-1007.23 
Lo" Dependence 
Bct\\ Cen Groups 2 72088.69 .5699 569 
Wuhm Group> -16 126489.72 
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As seen in table 3II, the effects of dependency threat 
severity on pay allocation decisions are s ignificant when 
dependence is high, but not when dependence is low, just 
as expected. This provides additional support for the 
effects of threat severity on the pay allocation deci sions 
of leaders who are highly dependent on direct reports 
who threaten the dependence relationship. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how 
dependence relationships and threats to those 
relationships are related to one another and how these 
variables are useful in explaining leaders' allocations of 
resources to direct reports , particularly in a pay allocation 
context. The specific research issues addressed in this 
study were: 1) the interactive effects of dependence and 
dependency threat on leaders' pay alloca tion decisions; 
and 2) the linear effects of the severi ty of direct report 
threats on leaders ' pay allocation dec isions for direct 
reports upon whom they are highly dependent. In thi s 
study, there was empirical support for both research 
questions. 
Overall, the results of thi s study provide evidence that, 
under certain conclitions, leaders' pay allocation decisions 
can be influenced by direct reports. Direct report threats 
had significant effects on leaders' pay allocati on 
decisions when the leader was hi ghly dependent on the 
direct report. These findings replicate those of previous 
research (Bartol & Martin , 1990; 1989) . In additi on, the 
direct relationship between the severi ty of the direct 
report ' s threat and the amount of pay a llocated was 
supported. This is a unique contribution of thi s work, as it 
is the first study to include several leve ls of threa t 
severity; allowing the investigation of its linear effects on 
pay allocation decisions . 
The practical implications deri ved from this study 
apply to direct reports and to organiza ti ons. Direct reports 
are given information regarding the types of behaviors 
effective in influencing their leaders and organizations 
are given information which would allow them to better 
understand the resource allocation dec isions that are 
made by their leaders. More specifica ll y, do ing the things 
necessary to create dependence and threatening the 
dependency relationship once establi hed were the 
behaviors found to be effecti ve . Although most of the 
factors which increase the amount of dependence a leader 
has on a direct report are situationa l, direct repot1s can 
increase the amount of dependence the leader has on 
them by increasing their performance and by establi shing 
connections to powerful others in the organization 
3 13 
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(Kanter, 1977). Direct reports wishing to gain large 
resource allocations from the ir leaders must not only 
create a situation in which the leader is dependent on 
them, but must al so threaten the dependency relationship. 
Direct reports need to be certain the influence attempt 
will be perceived in the manner intended . Sometimes, 
there are negative consequences associated with the use 
of more severe influence attempts (Freedman, 1978; 
Kotter, 1978; Thacker & W ayne, 1995; Wortman & 
Linsenmeier, 1977). Finally, direct reports need to be 
aware that certain allocators do not respond to any issues 
other than performance when making pay allocation 
decis ions. With these alloca tors, direct reports would be 
wise to avo id any type of influence attempt other than 
providing the allocator with rational, performance-based 
reasons behind their request for a pay increase. Therefore, 
deciding upon an appropriate tack should be exercised 
with care. 
Organizations need to understand that when making 
pay allocation decisions, the ir leaders may be influenced 
solely by direct report performance or by the existence of 
a threatened dependency re lationship between the leader 
and a direct report. Depending on the c ircu mstances, one 
may be encouraged over the other. For example, if the 
culture was built on " fair and equi tabl e treatment for all ", 
then the organization would probabl y want to encourage 
a llocators to focus solely on perfo rmance. On the other 
hand, if the organization was experi encing high employee 
turnover and tight labor market conditions, it might want 
to encourage its leaders to do whatever was necessary to 
retai n cri ti cal employees. 
Future research on the dependence-dependency threat 
interaction mi ght begin to look at severa l d imensions of 
dependency threats besides the severity d imension 
investiga ted in thi s study. Such d imension s inc lude threat 
type , implic it-explicit natu re of threats , threat 
legitimacy, source credib ili ty, freque ncy of threat 
behavior, and number of others invo lved . Research is 
needed which exa mines the effects of differen t types of 
threa ts on leaders' resource allocation decisions. For 
exampl e, differences tn the resu lting allocations 
depending on whether the di rect repotis use influen ce 
attempts such as threats to go above the leader 's head to a 
h igher source in the organization versus threa tening to 
qu it need to be identified . T he impli ci t versus explicit 
nature of the threa t a lso sho uld be inves tigated . Perhaps 
one is more e ffect ive than another in onvincing a leader 
to comply. Source credib ili ty is extreme ly important in 
de termin ing the success of the infl uence attempt. One 
may not obta in compliance from the leade r if the leader 
docs not be lieve the subordinate can actua ll y can·y 
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through on the threa t. Of course, the leader may also not 
respond to the threat because the threat is not perceived to 
be legitimate. Ln other words, the source of the threat may 
be credible, but the particular threat used i not. The 
frequency with which the direct report threatens the 
dependence relationship may also determine the success 
of the influence attempt. 
Leaders who are continually threatened by a single 
direct report may possibly grow tired of thi s behavior and 
eventually either not respond to the direct report or 
respond in a negative way. Likewise, the number of other 
direct reports who also threaten the leader may determine 
the success of the influence attempt. There are limited 
resources to be distributed and the leader may not be ab le 
to comply with several requests for significant increases 
because, as more money is allocated to one direct report, 
it leaves less money to be allocated to the others. 
Other issues for future research pertain to the 
relationship between the al locator and the direct repo1i 
that is making the threat. As was indicated previously, 
some allocators do not look beyond performance when 
making merit-based allocations; others are more 
susceptible to "outside" influences and threats from direct 
reports. Therefore, the effects of the personality of the 
a llocator should be investigated. Also, the nature of the 
relationship between the allocator and direct report 
making the threat should be in vesti ga ted. Seemingly, the 
better the relationship between the two parties, the more 
likely the influence attempt by the direct report will be 
successful. Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory 
(Graen & Schiemann, 1978) proposes that a leader 
establishes special relationships wi th a small group of 
fol lowers (the " in-group") that benefit greatly from the 
relationship, while the remaining followers (the ''out-
group") get fewer rewards, such as the leader ' s time, 
attention , and critica l resources controlled by the leader. 
The current study has several limi tation that need to 
be addressed . F irst, although thi s study looked at the pay 
allocation decisions of prac ticing managers, it is sti II 
considered a laboratory experiment; therefore, the 
generalizability of the resul ts comes into question. For 
example, in thi s study, the subj ects (leaders) did not have 
any contact wi th the hypothetical direct reports. 
Therefore, there is no history of a re lationsh ip between 
them. Becau e of the lack o f interaction between the 
leader and direct rep01i , there were also no orgct ni zati onal 
ramifications for the leader compl ying with the focal 
direct report' s request or denyi ng it. In organi za tions, 
leaders have to li ve with their decisions. They interac t 
with direct rep01is on a daily basis. They more than likely 
would have to justify any recommendations to their 
Joumal of Business and Leadership : Research, Practice, and Teachin~ 
superiors. These conditions did not exist in the presem 
study. 
Another possible issue affecting generalizability may 
be related to the allocator's perceptions of being 
threatened. It is entirely possible that some allocators 
may not respond to certain types of influence attempts. 
More specifically, those with previous allocation 
experience may have seen direct reports in the past 
threaten certain actions and then not follow through. In a 
sense, these "experienced" allocators become "immune" 
to certain forms of threats and only respond after the 
threat passes a certain " threshold". In this study, analyses 
of the manipulation checks revealed that "experienced" 
allocators perceived the high threat severity condition to 
be significantly more severe than the medium threat 
severity condition, but did not perceive any differences 
between the medium and low threat severity conditions. 
On the other hand, " inexperienced" allocators perceived 
the medium threat severity condition to be significantly 
more severe than the low threat severity condition, but 
did not perceive any differences between the medium and 
high threat severity conditions. Of course, while 
plausit .;, this hypothesis was not tested and therefore 
remains speculation. It warrants further investigation in 
future research. 
Other limitations to thi s investigation involve context 
issues. The current study was conducted in a banking 
context. Pay allocators from other industries and 
backgrounds need to be examined . For example, as was 
di scussed previously, possessing specialized skills is one 
factor that may make a leader more dependent on a 
particular direct rep01i. Certain industties (e.g. , biotech 
or public accounting) have a greater proportion of jobs 
whi ch req uire more spec ialized skills than other 
industries (e.g., quick-service restaurants or retail). The 
relationships found in the current study may still hold (or 
maybe even found to be stronger). 
Dependence and dependency threat issues deserve further 
attention . In this study, leaders' pay allocation decisions 
were significantly affected when the leader was 
dependent on the direct report and when the direct report 
threatened the dependence relationship. In addition, under 
high dependence conditions, the more severe the 
dependency threat, the larger the amount allocated. 
However, it appears that perhaps some leaders are not as 
susceptible to influences outside of those warranted by 
the design of the pay a lloca tion system. Those leaders 
that are susceptible to outside influences may al so vary in 
their susceptibi li ty to attempts by direct reports to 
influence their deci sions. Poss ibl y, experienced allocators 
are not influenced by the same type of attempts as 
3 14 6
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inexperienced allocators. More work is needed in these 
areas in order to gain a more complete understanding of 
leaders' resource allocation behavior. 
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